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In an excellent and interesting article, John Quiggin surveys the environmental 
issues of the Murray-Darling basin and, citing the relevant economic literature, 
proposes an eclectic approach to their solution.  Quiggin’s preferred policy 
framework involves three elements: taxing the polluter, creation of new forms 
of communal property rights (to encourage Coasian bargaining or 
internalisation) and regulation (also to assist in achieving sustainability). 
 
I make three connected comments.  Firstly, Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) 
showed that the combination of Pigovian taxation and Coasian bargaining, of 
the kind that Quiggin wishes to encourage, can be inconsistent, in that 
bargaining can move the economy away from the Pareto efficient allocation 
that would be achievable by taxation alone.  My second comment revolves 
around the dual meanings of the words ‘unilateral’ and ‘reciprocal’.  Quiggin 
concentrates on externalities that are unilateral in a physical sense.  In contrast, 
Coase (1960) assumes as a practical matter that externalities are reciprocal in an 
economic sense. If so, it tells against many strong claims in favour of specific 
forms of public intervention—Coase claimed regulating the polluter, or 
awarding damages against the polluter, or taxing the polluter will not 
necessarily improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources.  My final 
remarks relate to the concept of efficiency used by Quiggin and Coase, and how 
Quiggin’s economics leads him to what I take to be the central message in 
Coase (1960).  My comments relate only to efficiency and not directly to equity 
considerations
1; and not to Quiggin’s argument concerning the value of notions 
of sustainability. 
 
Turn now to the first issue: that Coase’s 1960 analysis of bargaining solutions 
would “trump” the Pigovian tax, even in cases when the Pigovian tax is in fact 
optimal.  The argument is illustrated in Figure 1, adapted from Figure 2 of 
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962).  There is an activity in quantity Q that 
person A can decide upon, which benefits A and harms person B.  The benefit 
and harm are shown as marginal evaluations, with MEA measured 
conventionally, and MEB shown for convenience as its negative.  Assume that 
there is nothing that B can do to relieve or increase her hurt.  Left to herself, A 
will choose quantity Q1. With a Pigovian tax schedule in place, MEA – MEB 
becomes A’s marginal evaluation schedule, post tax, and Q2 becomes A’s 
independent adjustment equilibrium, post tax.   
 
However, there is a Coasian twist that links tax remedies with Quiggin’s 
advocacy of reforms in property rights.  At Q2 the private marginal evaluations 
of A and B differ (zero, for A; less than zero, for B).  Say that a change in 
property rights so improves the climate for Coasian bargaining that it becomes 
costless.  The damaged party, B, pays the polluter, A, to reduce Q until the 
                                              
1 In his section on property rights, Quiggin’s emphasis shifts from efficiency to equity.  
However, the bulk of his argument is about efficiency.  5
quantity becomes Q3.  Buchanan and Stubblebine call a point like Q3 a “Pareto 
equilibrium” (p. 380), meaning, I think, that there are no more feasible “gains 
from trade” to be made.  Alternatively, it could be called the Coasian 
equilibrium under the Pigovian tax regime.
 2  (Note that, because tax revenue 
falls, the movement from Q2 to Q3 is not a Pareto improvement.) 
 
This example simply assumed away the issue of the reciprocal nature of 
externalities, to which we now turn.  In his section entitled “Externality”, 
Quiggin wrote that “A second crucial distinction is that between unilateral and 
reciprocal or congestion externalities.  Unilateral externalities arise when the 
actions of one party generate externalities affecting another, but not vice versa.  
To the extent that the actions of upstream users degrade water quality for 
downstream users, the salinity problem may be viewed as a unilateral nonpoint 
externality…The externality framework is most valuable in the consideration of 
unilateral externalities.”  Similarly, when discussing property rights, Quiggin 
asserted that “Coase discussed unilateral externalities involving two parties.”  
(pp. 77-8, emphasis added). 
 
A Coase-like example will do to illustrate the reciprocal nature of externalities, 
when considered from the viewpoint of the devising of policies to improve 
allocative efficiency.  A man increases the height of a chimney, which has the 
effect of polluting the air of another property owner.  For efficiency reasons, 
and without further economic inquiry, should the chimney owner be forced to 
close his chimney or to modify its use, so as to restore the air quality previously 
enjoyed by his neighbour?  Or should a tax be levied, so that the polluter pays?   
 
Surely it is obvious that the actions of building and using the chimney are what 
caused the externality.  Well, no.  If the polluted party were to close his door or 
window, or to install an air filter, or to live somewhere else, then the externality 
would be ameliorated and possibly completely removed.  The crucial economic 
fact is that the actions or inactions of both parties jointly cause the externality 
problem. The reciprocality of “unilateral externalities” consists in the fact that 
the damage caused to the injured party depends on the actions and inactions of 
that party, as well as on the actions and inactions of the polluter.  Through this 
reasoning, applied in numerous examples, Coase argued that various legal or 
                                              
2 There is a different Coasian (or costless bargaining) equilibrium for each different tax 
regime, and a different optimal Pigovian tax for each bargaining situation.  In particular, the 
Coasian equilibrium under the no-tax regime is Q2; and the optimal Pigovian tax with 
costless bargaining is zero.  As to the Pareto optimality of Q2 and Q3  in Figure 1: Q2 is P-O 
when bargaining between A and B is costless and no pollution tax has been imposed; and 
Q2 is also P-O when no bargaining can take place and the tax schedule MEB is imposed.  
However, Q3 is P-O if bargaining is costless and the Pigovian tax schedule MEB is imposed; 
and is Q3 is also P-O if there is no bargaining between A and B, and if a tax schedule 
suitably heavier than MEB is imposed. (The required tax schedule, not drawn, would 
impose a tax of MEA if output is Q3.)    6
property rights or regulatory “remedies” would not necessarily improve 
matters. 
 
Turn to Quiggin’s central example of upstream users whose activities adversely 
affect downstream users.  According to Quiggin, the upstream users are the 
generators of a unilateral externality.  By this he meant that the downstream 
users —and this claim is crucial—are doing nothing to harm the production of 
the upstream users. 
 
However, a legislative, fiscal, regulatory or legal remedy, afforded the 
downstream producers, does harm upstream users.  It would contribute to 
economic efficiency only if such a remedy caused an increase in the 
downstream net production or surplus greater than the induced fall in upstream 
surplus.
3  In thinking about this cost-benefit test, note that, once the remedy is 
in place, the downstream producers, actual or potential, when deciding on their 
level of activity, need not take into account the harm that they do to the 
upstream producers (via the operation of the remedy).  As in the chimney 
example, such a remedy may do more harm than good. 
 
Remember that I am focusing entirely on economic efficiency.  Coase’s index 
of economic efficiency is the value of net product; Quiggin’s is similar 
(aggregate net surplus); both are practical versions of the cost-benefit or 
Hypothetical Compensation Principle.  To achieve improvements in efficiency 
on these criteria, we should choose the policy or legal remedy that generates the 
largest social product (or surplus).  For non-tax remedies, this requires 
assessing the costs and benefits of all possible actions of both parties; choosing 
the set of actions that maximises aggregate net benefit; specifying the feasible 
policy action that would implement the maximising allocation.  (The 
consequences of reciprocality for taxation are considered later).  As an 
example, Quiggin (2001) reports on work in Quiggin (1988), which made a 
comparison between the allocation that maximises the sum (S*) of upstream 
and downstream surpluses and the allocation that maximises the upstream 
surplus first (SU), and then the downstream surplus (SD).  The difference 
between S* and SU +SD Quiggin identifies as the “social loss associated with the 
upstream-downstream externality”; or as the difference between a regime with 
“common property” and a regime of “open access” (2001, p. 80). 
 
Running a cost-benefit study of all feasible actions is a difficult task; but what 
are the alternatives?  Rules of thumb or legal rules?  Coase was sceptical that 
judges or policy makers can, in every instance, select the remedy that achieves 
the most efficient outcome. What has attracted the most attention in Coase’s 
article is his discussion of situations in which a judge and a policy maker need 
                                              
3 This is a simplification which assumes, for example, that the Murray-Darling is an isolated 
system.  7
do nothing. When the affected parties will negotiate a Pareto-improving 
change, it does not matter to whom property rights are awarded (if that were the 
remedy under consideration). That is, when transaction costs are low enough, a 




The fame of the “Coase theorem” is despite the fact that the bulk of Coase’s 
1960 article is about hard cases, when spontaneous solutions cannot be relied 
upon.  Concerning these, Coase set out to throw doubt on the belief in the 
efficacy of any single or simple rule (like the rule of first settlement, as in the 
case of the country estate troubled by an airfield; or the rule that ‘the polluter 
must pay’; or the rule of “do nothing”).  
 
How then to reduce the social loss?  Quiggin earlier (1988) discussed a 
corrective policy very like a Pigovian tax on the upstream producers (namely, to 
raise the price of water).  At the end of his 1960 article, Coase included 
Pigovian taxation in the class of remedy against which his strictures apply: “A 
tax system which was confined to a tax on the producer for damage caused 
would tend to lead to unduly high costs being incurred for the prevention of 
damage.  Of course this could be avoided if it were possible to base the tax, not 
on the damage caused, but on the fall in the value of production (in the widest 
sense) resulting from the emission of smoke.  But to do so would require a 
detailed knowledge of individual preference and I am unable to imagine how 
the data needed for such a taxation system could be assembled” (p. 41). As Ng 
(2002) has pointed out, Coase was wrong about taxation, in that the 
introduction of an infinitesimal tax on A’s activity must improve efficiency, as 
Coase defined efficiency improvements.  To illustrate, at Q1 in Figure 1, which 
is A’s independent adjustment equilibrium before the tax, A’s marginal 
valuation of her own activity is zero, while B’s valuation must be negative; 
therefore, a marginal fall in A’s activity harms A less than it benefits B (and 
some tax is collected, also). To go confidently beyond an infinitesimal rate, 
detailed knowledge is required (eg, through policies, if such exist, that induce 
truthful revelation of all the required information). 
 
Conclusions: There is a theorem which says that, whatever the allocation of 
endowments (including property rights), a decentralised process of decision 
making can achieve an efficient outcome through markets.  It is the first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which becomes the “Coase 
theorem” when the words “through markets” are replaced with “through 
voluntary exchange”.  The theorems do not say that the voluntary exchange 
outcome is the best of all possible worlds; merely that policy—be it regulatory, 
                                              
4 On taxation, see the previous note.  Coase (1960) has a discussion of the externality caused 
to a business, by a machine located adjacent in the same building.  An efficient solution 
maybe involves modifications on the side of the injured party (and a side payment).  8
legislative, judicial, or any imposed solution, will hurt some and possibly help 
others. That is, imposed solutions cannot generate Pareto improvements (except 
by chance).  In particular, starting from zero, a marginal tax on the activity that 
generates the pollution will satisfy the hypothetical compensation principle, but 
will not be a Pareto improvement.  Person A will lose and would have selfish 
grounds to oppose the change. 
 
This is not to imply that all such impositions are necessarily bad or 
unjustifiable, but that they are not justified on the Paretian criteria for 
improvements in economic efficiency.  The approach called Constitutional 
Political Economy, pioneered by Buchanan and Tullock, and developed by 
Brennan and Buchanan, explores in economic terms the idea of exchange of 
agreements about rules of society (“the social contract”)—applying the Paretian 
criterion at one remove from ordinary policy-making.  For example, if people 
are risk averse, as is assumed in Quiggin’s expression on p. 81, behind the veil 
of uncertainty they would not agree to market or policy rules designed to 
maximise the sum of surpluses in all instances; would not agree to the unbridled 
operation of the hypothetical compensation principle; especially if the 
incidental redistributions are random or regressive with respect to initial levels 
of individual well-being, and large relative to the aggregate gains made.  But 
they would agree to some rules that forced them to do, in some circumstances, 
what they would not otherwise do voluntarily.
5 
 
There is in Quiggin (2001) an interesting discussion of possible ways to reduce 
the social loss, other than taxes on polluters.  Instanced is Dudley’s 1992 
proposal to define water drawing-rights in terms of shares of the capacity of the 
storage, rather than as rights to non-contingent amounts of water for delivery on 
demand.  As Quiggin correctly points out, instability of property rights 
encourages ‘rent seeking’ aimed at securing a reassignment of rights; ditto, for 
taxes and subsidies.  Turning Hayek (1945) on his head, Quiggin (2001, p. 88) 
makes the point that the economic information required to assign property 
rights efficiently in the first place, and once and for all, is the very information 
required for detailed central planning; ditto, for Pigovian tax schedules that take 
into account the costs of all possible actions and inactions of all the players, 
actual and potential (as Coase claimed in the quotation cited earlier).  That is to 
say, the search for simple but invariably efficiency-improving policy rules, as 
well as the search for perfect assignments of unchangeable property rights, are 
                                              
5 For example, they might agree to the pragmatic policy regime, to which I am attracted, 
under which environmental problems that are large, and singular, merit considerable 
detailed research and investigation (for tailored solutions); that any class of middle-sized 
environmental problems, with common characteristics and with large numbers of examples 
in the class, warrants some search for rule-based or ‘generalised’ solutions (like zoning); 
and that other problems are probably best left alone (or to the courts).  This policy regime 
requires methods for deciding into which class a problem falls.  9
quests for chimeras.




                                              
6 “As the expansionary phase drew to a close and problems of the mature water economy 
became evident, the need for appropriate economic institutions became apparent. Indeed, 
there was some tendency to suggest that the resolution of the problems was a simple matter 
of getting prices right (or, from a Coasian perspective, creating clearly defined property 
rights).  The experience of the last decide has shown that appropriate economic institutions 
are essential, but that the complexity of the problem is such that no simple policy solution is 
likely to prove adequate”  (Quiggin, 2001, p. 90, emphasis added).    10
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